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In the last two decades, the theory of games has increasingly domi-
nated microeconomic theory. Frank Fisher recently asserted that game
theory has become "the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists":
That ascendancy appears fairly complete. Bright young theorists today
tend to think of every problem in game-theoretic terms .... Every
department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one
theorist who thinks in game-theoretic terms.... The field appears to
be in an exciting stage of ferment.'
Seminars, economic journals, and Ph.D. dissertations are awash with
game-theoretic models of economic phenomena.2 The marginalist
revolution of Samuelson 3 is quickly being supplanted by the strategic
models of a new breed of game theorists. 4
This dramatic change in methodology stems from a series of break-
* Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Research Fellow, Ameri-
can Bar Foundation. B.A., Yale University; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. (Economics), Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. Avery Katz and Daryl Warder provided helpful comments.
1. Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RANDJ. ECON. 113,
113 (1989). Fisher's description of the "ascendancy" is echoed by other economists. See, e.g.,
Carl Shapiro, The Theory of Business Strategy, 20 RANDJ. ECON. 125, 125 (1989) ("This new wave
of [industrial organization] research consists almost exclusively of game-theoretic studies of
behavior and performance in imperfectly competitive markets.").
2. A casual glance at any issue of the leading microeconomicjournals such as Rand Jour-
nal of Economics or Review of Economic Studies will reveal several game theory articles. See, e.g.,
Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RANDJ. EcON.
70 (1985); Drew Fudenberg &Jean Tirole, Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information, 50
REV. ECON. STUD. 221 (1983).
3. Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Anthony Samuelson formalized the marginalist
method of utility and profit maximization. See PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947).
4. The new game theory is dominated by a closely knit group of co-authors which in-
cludes David Kreps, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson, Garth Saloner, Jean Tirole, and Robert
Wilson. These theorists often collaborate, and the history of game-theoretic advances turns
on the axes of their academic institutions: Stanford, M.I.T., Northwestern, and Harvard. See,
e.g., David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts & Robert Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the
Finitely Repeated Prisoners* Dilemma, 27J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982); Eric Maskin &Jean Tirole,
Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots, 43 J. ECON. THEORY 364 (1987).
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throughs in the ability to model dynamic games with asymmetric and
incomplete information. 5 Economists can now tractably analyze com-
plicated models (or "games") in which individuals ("players") are un-
certain or uninformed. These advances have enabled economists to
apply the "new" game theory to strategic aspects of everything from
bankruptcy to plea bargaining and patent "races." 6 The reality of to-
day's economic academy is that one cannot "do" microeconomic theory
without being able to model and solve economic games: Game-theo-
retic literacy is simply a prerequisite. 7
It is time that both friend and foe of law and economics take notice
of these developments. If history repeats itself, the dominant paradigm
of economics today will likely influence the legal scholarship of to-
morrow.8 Just as the efficient capital markets hypothesis has come to
influence our current conceptions of corporate law-demonstrated, for
example, by the Supreme Court's recent acceptance of the "Fraud on
the Market" theory for securities standing 9 -the "new" game theory
may very well seep into future law and economics scholarship.
So far, however, the advances of game theory have been slower to
diffuse into legal reasoning than other economic contributions. For ex-
ample, the capital asset pricing model, developed in the mid-sixties, has
gained much wider acceptance in the legal community than has game-
theoretic modelling.' 0 One explanation for this slow diffusion is that
new game theory techniques in a sense represent a research technology
with high barriers to entry. Even legal academics well-schooled in law
and economics have found it intimidating to master new concepts such
as "perfect Bayesian equilibria."' The exclusionary aspects of learn-
ing the new modelling techniques have also been felt within the eco-
nomics profession. The economists who pioneered and mastered these
new modelling tools were simply too busy applying them to take the
5. These terms are defined below. See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
6. See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELLJ. ECON.
437 (1978);Jennifer F. Reinganum, Innovation and Industry Evolution, 100 QJ. ECON. 81 (1985);
Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 ANi. ECON. REv. 713
(1988); Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, The Effects of Reorganization Law on Invest-
ment Efficiency (May 1989) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
7. It should be noted that economists are not unanimously in favor of this ascendancy.
For a recent debate on whether the game theory approach is fruitful, compare Fisher, supra
note 1, at 123 (game theorists have concentrated "on the analytically interesting questions
rather than on the ones that really matter for the study of real-life industries") with Shapiro,
supra note 1, at 134 ("the introduction of game-theoretic tools into the study of oligopolistic
competition has made it possible to analyze carefully a whole range of questions that were not
previously amenable to economic analysis").
8. For example, evolving economic theories of competition have affected antitrust analy-
sis. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1985).
9. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see Daniel F. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance
Theoy in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. I (1982).
10. See, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
(2d ed. 1984); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
II. Seep. 110.
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time to write systematically about how to apply them. 12
Into this pedagogical void comes Eric Rasmusen's new book, Games
and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Rgsmusen succeeds not
only in making game theory more comprehensible but also in enabling
readers actually to use these new techniques. In the jargon of econom-
ics, Rasmusen succeeds in lowering the costs for academics who wish to
enter the field. The book is sure to become the standard reference in
game theory and may by itself be responsible for significantly increas-
ing the diffusion rate of this new modelling "technology." If John-
ston's textbook has been responsible for teaching a generation of
students how to run econometric regressions,' 3 Rasmusen's text is
likely to teach the next generation of students how to model games with
asymmetric and imperfect information.1 4
With surprising clarity, Games and Information lays out the new contri-
butions of game theory in language that will be accessible to a large
proportion of the legal community.15 The book's contribution is three-
fold: It synthetically organizes and catalogs the sprawling literature on
games with imperfect information; it simplifies the games and distills
the insights of the path-breaking articles; and, more abstractly, it in-
troduces readers to the process of writing down and solving games.
The first two contributions respond to a well-defined need. The clari-
fied versions of important articles will make it easier to read and under-
stand the originals.' 6 But it is in achieving the final goal that the book
12. The situation has strong parallels to the recent development of cloning techniques
in biology. The few insiders with applied knowledge of recombinant DNA theory were so
busy doing their own research that outsiders had difficulty learning the details of genetic se-
quencing and the like. The first comprehensive guide to cloning did not appear until 1982.
See ToMt MANIATIS, E.F. FRrrscH &J. SANBROOKE, MOLECULAR CLONING (1982).
13. JOHN JOHNSTON, ECONOMMrmC METHODS (2d ed. 1972).
14. I echo Roger B. Myerson's comment on the back of the hardcover edition:
[Rasmusen's] book... will do much to bring game theory into the mainstream of
economics education. There has been an explosion of applications of game theory in
economics, especially in the area of information economics over the past decade....
Rasmusen's book is well-positioned to be the key text in such courses.
15. Although Rasmusen cautions in his preface that readers who "do not know the terms
'risk averse,' 'first order condition,' 'utility function,' 'probability density,' and 'discount rate'
... will not fully understand this book," p. 11, those with an undergraduate background in
economics or familiar with the law and economics literature will often have the requisite level
of sophistication. Indeed, because game theory is in some ways a more self-contained disci-
pline than other aspects of economics, even those innocent of economic training may find the
book a rewarding reference. And Rasmusen's lively style is "user friendly." For example, he
often includes tips for proper syntax in the game theory community. In exhorting readers to
attend game theory seminars, he waxes, "[T]here is a real thrill in hearing someone attack the
speaker with 'Are you sure that equilibrium is perfect?' after just learning the previous week
what 'perfect' means." P. 10.
16. The author explains:
Journal articles are more complicated and less clear than seems necessary in retro-
spect; precisely because it is original, even the discoverer rarely understands a truly
novel idea. After a few dozen successor articles have appeared, we all understand it
and marvel at its simplicity. But journal editors are unreceptive to new articles that
admit to containing exactly the same idea as old articles, just presented more
clearly.... This book tries to present an alternative.
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succeeds in truly becoming a user's manual. In his introduction, Ras-
musen declares that "[t]he efficient way to learn how to do research is
to start doing it, not to read about it."17 Throughout, Rasmusen's "let
us go then, you and I" approach invites the reader to join in the crea-
tive process of applying the techniques of game theory to real world
problems.18
The simple thesis of this review is that legal academics can profit
from mastering the insights of the new informational approach to game
theory and that Games and Information is an excellent vehicle for achiev-
ing this mastery. Throughout the fifties and sixties, economics re-
mained largely resistant to the virus of game theory.' 9 But the
resistance was broken by the new informational game theory of the sev-
enties-to the point that game theory now "seems to be swallowing up
microeconomics." 20
The advances in modelling imperfect and asymmetric information
that have made game theory a dominant methodology in micro-
economics are even more central to the analysis of legal issues. Asym-
metric information and strategic behavior are at the core of a large
number of legal policy issues. For example, Rasmusen notes that
"[giame theory is well suited to modelling takeovers because the take-
over process depends crucially on information and includes a number
of sharply delineated actions and events." '2 1 This point applies to a
large class of legal issues. The law abounds with instances in which
small numbers of players who have private information adopt strategies
to further their well-defined interests, and in which the substantive and
procedural legal rules specify to a highly detailed degree the "rules of
the game." 22 It is not surprising, then, that Rasmusen's book is littered
with a wide variety of legal games, including, for example, his models of
litigation and settlement, agency, predatory pricing, and regulatory
enforcement. 23
Yet legal scholarship has remained largely ignorant of these ad-
vances. Law review articles continue to be mindlessly mired in the
game theory "technology" of the fifties. Countless articles rearticulate
P. 10.
17. P. 17.
18. Rasmusen explains that his references to newspaper and magazine articles are "re-
minders that models ought eventually to be applied to specific facts, and that a great many
interesting situations are waiting for our analysis." P. 16.
19. With a few notable exceptions, game theory was stagnant throughout this period.
Rasmusen notes that "[b]y 1953 virtually all the game theory that was to be used by econo-
mists for the next 20 years had been developed." P. 13.
20. P. 13.
21. P. 301.
22. For example, game theory models of bargaining often need to adopt ad hoc assump-
tions about whether the buyer or the seller makes the first offer (and whether the other party
has an option of making a counteroffer). See pp. 227-43. In contrast, the procedural rules
governing Chapter 11 reorganizations clearly specify that the debtor in possession may sub-
mit the first "offer" in bargaining over corporate reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988).
23. See, e.g., pp. 60-65, 133-36, 302-06.
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the Prisoner's Dilemma, 24 but few even proceed to other bi-matrix
games.2 5 A LEXIS search of law review articles reveals very few in-
stances in which authors make reference to the Nash equilibrium con-
cept 2 6 -a prerequisite for solving even the simplest game.
While many academics may ultimately reject a game-theoretic ap-
proach to legal issues, it seems safe to predict that the approach will
increasingly find its way into legal analysis. 2 7 Informed criticism will
require at least a rudimentary mastery of its techniques. Eric Ras-
musen's book is well positioned to fill this need.
This review begins by sketching the method of using game theory to
model legal problems. The following sections summarize the central
insights of game theory regarding "credible" threats and asymmetric
information-especially playing out game theory's implications for in-
forming legal policy debates. I conclude by assessing the strengths and
weaknesses of the game-theoretic approach.
I. THE RULES OF THE GAME
A. The Modeller's Art
The applied thrust of Rasmusen's pedagogy is nowhere clearer than
in his first chapter:
Game theory as it will be presented in this book is a modelling tool, not
an axiomatic system. The presentation in this chapter is unconven-
tional. Rather than starting with mathematical definitions .... we will
start with a situation to be modelled, and build a game from it step by
step.2 8
Rasmusen then proceeds to lay out the types of choices that need to be
made in modelling. To establish "the rules of the game," modellers
need to define clearly:
1) the players-the individuals who make decisions;
2) the order of play and the actions available to each player at each
point in the game;
24. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate
Greenmail, 95 YALE LJ. 13, 22 (1985); Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution
of Cooperation (Book Review), 93 YALE LJ. 1147, 1150-51 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for Inter-
national Lawyers, 14 YALEJ. INT'L L. 335, 368-75 (1989).
26. Three such articles are Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforc-
ing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987); Robert L. Birmingham, Legal and Moral Duty in
Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 99 (1969); and
John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 556 (1987). I would like
to thank Avery Katz for pointing out this fact. Katz has himself written an important introduc-
tion to and application of game theory. Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and
Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation (Oct. 19, 1989) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
27. Possible forerunners of this trend include Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989), and Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
28. P. 22.
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3) the information available to players at the time they make deci-
sions; and
4) the outcome and payoffs for the players that result from different
combinations of actions. 29
By walking the reader through a myriad of models, Rasmusen in-
stills a sense of the process of game-theoretic modelling and shows how
to define systematically the essential elements of any game.
To construct a simple model of settlement in civil litigation,30 for
example, one can follow the checklist to define the essential elements of
the game. A simple model of tort settlement at a minimum would an-
swer the following questions:
Who are the players? Does the game consist of one potential de-
fendant and one potential plaintiff, or are there multiple plaintiffs that
might bring suit (against multiple defendants)? What are the actions
and the order of play? Does the game begin with the plaintiff's deci-
sion whether to sue (or should the defendant's decision whether to take
care be modelled)?
If the plaintiff brings suit, who should make the first settlement of-
fer? Should we allow the other party to propose a counteroffer? How
should we model the court's decisionmaking process if the case goes to
trial? What information do the players have? Does each player know
the likelihood of winning at trial? Does each player know what the
other player knows? What are the outcomes and payoffs? 3' How are
damages determined? What are the parties' legal fees, and at what
stage of the game are they incurred? Are the parties risk averse?
As this example illustrates, even the simplest games can present
modellers with a host of alternatives. Rasmusen conveys a sense of the
prevailing "tastes" in selecting from among these alternatives. In mod-
elling litigation settlement, for example, modellers could define in de-
tail different trial strategies (if the case goes to trial). But Rasmusen
argues for "'blackboxing': treating unimportant subcomponents of a
model in a cursory way."' 32 Thus, in modelling games of settlement it
may be useful to simplify the litigation process by focussing only on
interesting pretrial aspects. Blackboxing is one aspect of what Ras-
musen calls "no-fat modelling"-in which the modeller seeks "to dis-
29. Pp. 22-25.
30. Game-theoretic treatments of the settlement process can be found in I.P.L. P'ng,
Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 539 (1983), and Robert D.
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27J. ECON.
LrrERATURE 1067 (1989); see also pp. 60-65.
31. The "payoff" of a game refers to the expected utility that players receive from play-
ing the game. In contrast, the "outcome" of the game refers to nonutility variables affected
by the playing of the game. For example, in a tort settlement game the payoffs of the individ-
ual players refer to their out-of-pocket losses or gains, while the outcome of the game would
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cover the simplest assumptions needed to generate an interesting
conclusion; the starkest, barest, model that has the desired result."
33
B. "Solving" the Game
Game-theoretic modelling consists of defining the rules of the game
and then "solving" the game-deriving the best strategies for each
player and the equilibrium that will result if each player undertakes her
best strategy. To solve the game, a modeller must decide what consti-
tutes an equilibrium of "best strateg[ies]." '34 The modeller must
choose an equilibrium or solution concept.35 The most commonly used so-
lution concept is the Nash equilibrium.36 A set of strategies is a Nash
equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate from her strategy
given that the other players do not deviate. 37 A set of Nash strategies
will be resilient against deviance-and therefore constitute an equilib-
rium-because each player can do no better if the other players
conform.
Rasmusen attempts throughout the book to convey a sense of the
art of game modelling. The art appears not only in defining the game
but also in "solving" the game. Often, the modeller must propose a set
of strategies and then check to see if they constitute a Nash equilibrium
of best responses. In contrast to methods for solving traditional
microeconomic models (of constrained maximization), game-theoretic
methodology is not mechanical:
[T]he modeller must make a guess that some strategy combination is
an equilibrium before he tests it [to see if it is Nash]. Some economists
are quite frustrated when they learn there is no general way to make
the initial guess. The [traditional microeconomics] maximization ap-
proach is so straightforward, on the other hand, that we could let a
trained ape do it. Just set up a payoff function with some constraints,
take derivatives, and solve the first order conditions. That approach is
less appropriate to game theory .... 38
Since there can be a multitude of possible strategies, game theorists




36. Alternative equilibrium concepts include dominant strategy and iterated dominant strategy
equilibria. Pp. 28-32. For example, a set of strategies constitutes a dominant strategy equilib-
rium if each player's strategy is a best response to any strategies of other players. By contrast,
the less demanding Nash equilibrium solution concept requires that each player's strategy be
a best response only to the other players' Nash equilibrium strategies.
In the famous Prisoner's Dilemma Game, each player has a dominant strategy of linking,
because it is the best response regardless of whether the other player finks or cooperates. A
dominant strategy equilibrium is a more robust solution concept, but there are many games
for which dominant strategies do not exist. Note that all dominant strategy equilibria are also
Nash equilibria, but not vice-versa. P. 33.
37. P. 33.
38. P. 140.
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Nash. For example, if the players are identical in the sense of having
identical information and having identical available actions, then it is
often sensible to search for a symmetric equilibrium consisting of iden-
tical strategies.3 9
II. THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION
A. Modelling Dynamic Games of Imperfect Information
The new technology for modelling games is apparent even in the
method of representation. The older game theory of the fifties and six-
ties used the normal form representation, while the game theory models
of the seventies and eighties have increasingly represented games by
using the extensive form. The normal form representation of a game uses
a matrix to relate players' strategies to the payoffs of the game. For
example, consider a coordination game in which two players can in-
crease their individual payoffs if they match strategies. Such a game
would apply, for example, to cumulative voting for corporate directors
in which two minority shareholders may wish to vote for the same can-
didates to insure their election. 40 Assume that two minority sharehold-
ers, Smith and Jones, must each vote either for herself or for the
other.41 Smith votes first. If Smith andJones split their votes, they lose
the election, and each receives a payoff of -1; if they can coordinate,
they win representation on the board and receive a payoff of + 1. Since
Smith moves first, she has to choose one of two strategies [vote Smith]
or [vote Jones]. Because Jones votes second, her strategies are contin-
gent on all information available to her-particularly on the candidate
for whom Smith voted. Accordingly, Jones has to choose among four
possible strategies:
[if Smith votes Smith, vote Smith; if Smith votes Jones, vote Smith]
[if Smith votes Smith, vote Smith; if Smith votes Jones, vote Jones]
[if Smith votes Smith, vote Jones; if Smith votes Jones, vote Smith]
[if Smith votes Smith, vote Jones; if Smith votes Jones, vote Jones].
This simple game can now be depicted using the normal form by con-
structing a matrix which relates the possible strategies of the players to
specific payoffs:
39. This intuition has been formalized into a proof of existence. Partha Dasgupta & Eric
Maskin, The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory, 53 REv. ECON.
SrUD. 1 (1986); see p. 127.
40. This example is based upon the "Pure Coordination" game that Rasmusen describes
at pp. 43-47.
41. Even in this simple example, the voting of the majority shareholder, say Mr. Trump,
and the possibility that the minority shareholders could vote for him are suppressed or
"blackboxed."
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SHAREHOLDER VOTING GAME 142
NORMAL FORM
Jones
[Smith, Smith] [Smith, Jones] [Jones, Smith] [Jones, Jones]
[Smith] (1, 1) (1, 1) (-1, -1) (-1, -1)Smith [Jones] (-1, -1) (1, 1) (-1, -1) (1, 1)
Payoffs to (Smith, Jones)
The same game can be represented using the extensive form by con-
structing a game tree that details the sequence of play. A game tree
consists of a series of nodes which are the points in the game at which a
player takes an action. The different possible actions are represented
as lines radiating from each node. The action of the game is usually
represented from left to right and the payoffs are represented at the far
right end points.
FIGURE I





Q = Smith Node Vote Jones (1,1)
O= Jones Node
Payoffs to (Smith, Jones)
The extensive form representation is superior to the matrix repre-
sentation of the normal form because it is much easier to represent the
42. Jones's strategies are abbreviated. For example,
[if Smith votes Smith, vote Smith; if Smith votes Jones, vote Smith]
is represented as [Smith, Smith].
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information available to the players at specific nodes-that is, at the
time they make their decisions. This superiority of the extensive form
representation can be seen by comparing the preceding formulations of
the Shareholder Voting Game. Analyzing the normal form matrix, one
can see that the strategies
Smith plays Uones] and Jones plays [Jones, Jones]
represent a Nash equilibrium. 43 However, by exploring the extensive
form representation, we can see an important weakness of the Nash
equilibrium concept in games with sequential action. Jones's equilib-
rium strategy mandates that Jones vote "Jones" even if Smith votes
"Smith" beforehand. In extensive form terminology, this strategy dic-
tates thatJones should vote "Jones" regardless of whetherJones finds
herself at nodeJ, orJ 2. In the proposed equilibrium, Jones always finds
herself at J2, so her choice of matching Smith's vote by also voting
"Jones" is Nash. This equilibrium is weak, however, because if Jones
found herself at J, she would want to deviate from the proposed equi-
librium strategy of voting "Jones" (she would prefer to match Smith's
vote of "Smith"). This weakness has caused game theorists to
strengthen (and to refine) the Nash solution concept with the alluring
notion of "perfection," to which we will return below. 44
Normal form (matrix) representation suppresses the dynamic nature
of the game and the information that is revealed as the game is played.
In the Shareholder Voting Game, the normal form representation
makes it more difficult to analyze how Jones's knowledge of Smith's
vote affects the equilibrium. More importantly, the extensive form rep-
resentation can easily diagram when players have imperfect informa-
tion. For example, if we changed the foregoing voting game so that
Jones continued to vote second but did not know for whom Smith
voted, the extensive form representation would become:
43. One can also see that
Smith plays [Smith], Jones plays [Smith, Smith]
and
Smith plays [Smith], Jones plays [Smith, Jones]
are Nash equilibria.
44. See text accompanying notes 54-64 infra.
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FIGURE 2
SHAREHOLDER VOTING GAME II
EXTENSIVE FORM
Vote.ones (-1,-) Smith - (1,I)
O mihNoeVote Jones "e(-1,1)
vo te Smith iVoeSit1..e(-,1
o= Jones Node
Payoffs to (Smith, Jones)
The dotted line surrounding nodesJl and J2 represents Jones's infor-
mation set at the time when Jones must decide for whom to vote. A
player's information set for a particular point in the game "is the set of
different nodes in the game tree that he knows might be the actual
node, but between which he cannot distinguish by direct observa-
tion."'45 Because Jones does not know how Smith voted, she does not
know when she votes whether she is at Jl or 1_. This reformulation of
the voting game also represents a game in which Jones and Smith vote
simultaneously-since with simultaneous voting both Jones and Smith
cast their ballots without knowing the choice 
of the other.4 6
Extensive form representation is especially 
appropriate for games
with asymmetric or incomplete information. 
In games with asymmetric in-
formation, some player has useful private 
information-that is, infor-
mation that is not directly observable 
by other players.
4 7 Thus, in the
Tort Settlement Game,
4 8 we could assume that only the potential 
de-
fendant originally knows whether due 
care was taken. In a game of
incomplete information, at least one player 
is unsure about any or all of
the different constitutive parts of a 
game: players, strategies, or
payoffs.4 9 Games of incomplete information 
are often modelled with
45. P. 48.46. A simultaneous voting game could 
also be cast with Jones having the first 
nodal
choice and Smith's subsequent nodes included 
in a single information set.
47. P. 53.
48. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
49. Pp. 53.55.
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Nature moving first by randomly choosing among different states of the
world. 50
For example, return to the Shareholder Voting Game, but assume
that there are two types ofJoneses in the world: cooperative and per-
verse. The cooperative Joneses of the world have the same preference
as before, but perverseJoneses have noncooperative preferences, such
that matched voting reduces their welfare to a payoff of -1 and mis-
matched voting increases their welfare to a payoff of + 1. If Smith knows
that 10 percent of the Joneses in the world are "perverse" but not
which type ofJones she is facing, then the voting game can be reformu-
lated as a game of incomplete information. If we further assume that
Jones does know her own type, then it is also a game of asymmetric
information:
FIGURE 3









( )= Nature Node Vote Jones ( 1,-i1)O= Smith Node
O= Jones Node
Payoffs to (Smith, Jones)
As depicted in Figure 3, Nature moves first and, unbeknownst to Smith,
chooses Jones's type, cooperative or perverse. Smith must then vote
without knowing which type of Jones she is facing. Jones, however,
knows what type she is, and her information sets are therefore individ-
50. See p. 55. Using "Nature" as a player is a convenient way of modelling the origin of
individual players' incomplete knowledge.
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ual nodes. 5 ' Node S, and the action that branches from it is a subgame
that is identical to Voting Game 1.52
Alternatively, if we assume symmetric information so that neither
Smith norJones knewJones's type at the time of voting, then the game
tree would be:
FIGURE 4




Cooperative Vote Smith (-1,1)
( Vo te Jo n e s (11)
Vote Jones (-1,1)
® =Natr Node Vtns (,i
V= Smith Node
S= Jones Node
Payoffs to (Smith, Jones)
Jones, by moving second, knows for whom Smith voted. But because
she does not know her own type, she cannot distinguish between either
nodesJ andJs orJ2 andJ 4.
Extensive form representation has as yet rarely been employed in
legal periodicals, but it allows modellers to visualize the sequential na-
ture of games and to define with greater precision the information
available to decisionmakers at the time a decision is made. These tech-
niques for representing dynamic games with imperfect information 5 3
51. Singleton is the term of art for information sets consisting of individual nodes. P. 50.
52. The subgame beginning with node S, is a discoordination game similar to the game of
"matching pennies," in which one player wins if the pennies match and the other player wins
if they do not. See p. 40.
53. Imperfect information is a term of art that encompasses games that have incomplete
information or asymmetric information or both. P. 51. In a game of perfect information, on
the other hand, all information sets are singletons. Id.
1303May 1990) GAMVE THEORY
HeinOnline -- 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1303 1989-1990
STANFORD L4 W REVIEW
are the methodological building blocks for the substantive innovations
to which we now turn.
B. Perfectness and Precommitment
In dynamic games, the Nash solution concept is weak in an impor-
tant sense because it does not test the stability of deviations from the
equilibrium path. This was the reason, for example, for the criticism of
the Nash equilibrium concept in connection with Voting Game I. 54
That game is one of pure coordination in which each player strives to
cooperate and to match each other's action. In games where the play-
ers' interests are opposed, however, off-equilibrium responses can be
very important to decisions on the equilibrium path. A player may feel
the need, for example, to issue a threat, which "is a promise to carry
out a certain action if another player deviates from his equilibrium
actions." 55
The unadorned Nash solution concept fails to restrict players from
making noncredible threats. To illustrate this phenomenon, consider a
simple model of entry deterrence. A potential entrant moves first and
decides whether to enter a market. An incumbent responds by decid-
ing whether to fight the entry by lowering its price. Assume that (a)
without entry, the incumbent earns monopoly profits of 100; (b) if the
incumbent fights entry, the incumbent breaks even and the entrant
loses 10; and (c) if the incumbent does not fight entry, they split the
monopoly profits. Under these conditions, the extensive form repre-
sentation of the game is:
54. The Nash equilibrium in that game which consisted of
Smith plays [Jones] and Jones plays [Jones, Jones]
would not be stable if, for some reason, Smith played [Smith], because Jones in that case
would want to deviate from her equilibrium strategy to match the earlier vote. See note 36
supra and accompanying text.
55. P. 83.
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7-> (0,100)(9 = Entrant Node
Q= Incumbent Node
Payoffs to (Entrant, Incumbent)
The strategy combination of [Don't Enter], [Fight Entry] is a Nash equi-
librium5 6 that generates an equilibrium outcome of no entry. But this
equilibrium depends crucially on the incumbent's threat of how it will
respond to the potential entrant's out-of-equilibrium behavior (entry).
In this example, the incumbent's threat is very hollow. If entry occurs,
the incumbent would no longer have an incentive to follow through on
its threat. In game-theoretic terms, if an incumbent ever finds itself at
node I,, it will no longer have an incentive to fight. The incumbent
thus faces a dynamic inconsistency. Even though ex ante it would like to
threaten a fight, ex post it prefers to collude with the new entrant.
Game theorists have refined the Nash solution concepts to admit
only equilibria that are dynamically consistent. The additional require-
ment of perfectness (or subgame perfection) guarantees this result. A
combination of strategies is a perfect Nash equilibrium if the strategies
satisfy the Nash requirements for every subgame.5 7 In the entry deter-
rence game, the strategies [Don't Enter], [Fight] are not "perfect," be-
cause the strategy [Fight] is not a Nash equilibrium for the subgame
starting at node I,.
Refining the Nash equilibrium with the notion of perfection rigor-
ously distinguishes credible from noncredible threats. Simply put,
"[p]erfectness rules out threats that are not credible."5 8 In many legal
contexts, adversaries will wish to precommit to particular types of strat-
56. If the incumbent is going to fight, the potential entrant will not enter; and if there is
no entry, the incumbent doesn't have an opportunity to deviate. This establishes that the
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egies. The concept of perfection clarifies the prerequisites for precom-
mitment. A threat will be credible only if the strategy remains an
equilibrium on all possible paths, both on the equilibrium path and on
any other path which branches off into other subgames. 59
Players can precommit to threatening strategies by taking actions ex
ante which restrict or discourage ex post deviation from executing the
threat. An important form of precommitment is the elimination of sub-
sequent unstable subgames. This in a sense is what Ulysses accom-
plished by having himself tied to the mast as his ship sailed past the
Sirens. But credible precommitment can also occur when a player al-
ters the payoffs on what would otherwise be an unstable subgame. For
example, if two people need to bargain over how to divide $1,000 in
gains from a certain trade, one party might be able to strengthen her
bargaining position by promising to pay a charity $1,000 if she receives
less than a specified percentage of the surplus. 60 Poison pills which
contingently destroy a target corporation's value unless removed by the
target management serve a similar function.6 1
Perfection also clarifies why finitely repeated games tend to "un-
ravel." Rasmusen, for example, considers whether a chainstore repeat-
ing the Entry Deterrence Game in twenty separate markets could add
credibility to its threat of fighting "because the chainstore would fight
the first entrant to deter the next 19."62 The restriction of subgame
perfection leads game theorists to begin by analyzing the last repetition
of the game because it is the simplest subgame. From the foregoing
analysis, the threat of fighting entry in the last repetition is not credible-
so rational incumbents will accommodate entry in the final period. The
process of backward induction can then be used to analyze preceding
periods. Given that the incumbent will accommodate entry in the last
period, what will happen in the next to last period? As Rasmusen
notes: "The chainstore can gain nothing from building a reputation for
ferocity" in the next to last period "because it is common knowledge
that he will Collude with the last entrant anyway. So he might as well
Collude in the 19th market." '63
This process of backward induction (in combination with the re-
quirement of subgame perfection) leads to an unraveling.64 The chain-
59. Id.
60. See ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 48-49 (1988).
61. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATIONS 114 (1984).
62. P. 88. This possibility has been embraced by, among others, Richard Posner:
If... a firm operates in [a] number of markets and faces actual or potential competi-
tors each of whom is limited to one of its markets, it may find it worthwhile to expend
considerable resources in crushing a single competitor in order to develop a reputa-
tion (for willingness to use predatory pricing).
Quoted in George A. Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide to the Predatory Pricing Literature, in STRATEGY,
PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 155, 161 (S. Salop ed. 1981).
63. P. 88.
64. This unraveling is at the heart of Selten's Chainstore Paradox. Reinhard Selten, The
Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978); see also p. 88.
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store owner faces the paradox of dynamic inconsistency. It would like
to commit to a tough strategy of fighting entry, but even in a repeated
game its threats are not credible: In the end it will have no incentive to
fight.
C. Learning from the Game: "The Play's the Thing"
In games with asymmetric information, the uninformed players may
have opportunities to deduce the private information of their rivals by
watching how their rivals behave. In terms of Bayesian statistics, a
player may be able to update her prior beliefs by taking account of how
the knowledgeable players behave.6 5 For example, in certain games of
tort settlement, one player's offer, or another player's rejection, can
convey information.66
This process of learning from another player's actions is captured in
the notion of a separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, dif-
ferent type players' choices of different equilibrium strategies reveal
their types to the previously uninformed player. In a pooling equilib-
rium, the different types of informed players choose the same strategy
in equilibrium, preventing the uninformed players from deducing their
opponents' types.67 The concept of separating equilibria is especially
relevant for games of asymmetric information in which Nature chooses
one player's type, but in which Nature's choice is not observable by
other players.
For example, Alan Schwartz recently presented a model of loan pri-
orities in which an uninformed lender seeks to deduce the default risk
of two different types of debtors: debt-free firms and firms with prior
debt.6 8 If these two types of debtors do not distinguish themselves,
then in the pooling equilibrium that ensues the lender will charge all
debtors an interest rate that represents a weighted average of the
higher rate (appropriate for firms with prior debt) and the lower rate
(appropriate for debt-free firms). 69 This pooling equilibrium benefits
the high-risk debtors because they receive a subsidized interest rate.
The low-risk debtors, however, have an incentive to reveal their identity
to the lenders so that they can receive the lower, nonpooled interest
rate.
70
65. Bayes's Rule is a probabilistic formula for updating a prior belief given new informa-
tion. See p. 58. The concept of a perfect Nash equilibrium can be further refined for dynamic
games of asymmetric information. A "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium" is that perfect equilib-
rium in which the information sets are rational-that is, conform with Bayes's Rule. See p.
110.
66. See Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987).
67. Some games engender intermediate degrees of pooling or separation.
68. Schwartz, supra note 27.
69. That is, r* = pr + (1-p)r5 where r* is the pooled interest rate, p is the probability
that the potential debtor is currently debt-free, and r/ and rj are the competitive interest rates
that the lender would charge debt-free and indebted firms, respectively, if their types were
known. See id. at 225.
70. See also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Contracts with Lock-in, 79 Am. ECON.
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If the cost of revealing the information to the lender is sufficiently
small, a separating equilibrium will exist in which the low-risk debtors
reveal their status and pay the lower interest rate. In this equilibrium,
the high-risk debtors do not reveal their status, but still pay an interest
rate higher than the pooled rate, because the low-risk debtors have
dropped out of the pool. In many instances, the uninformed players
can undertake strategies that will induce separation and its concomitant
information revelation. In many contractual settings, the uninformed
party may propose a menu of contracts that induces different types of
parties to self select different contracts. 71
Game-theoretic models of asymmetric information are especially apt
for depicting issues of agency which pertain to many legal arenas.72 In-
deed, principal-agent models have come to represent a major compo-
nent of the new game theory literature.73 Because principals often are
uninformed of an agent's ability or effort, principal-agent relationships
can easily fall prey to adverse selection and moral hazard.
Adverse selection occurs when the players have asymmetric infor-
mation about a player's type. For example, a life insurer may not know
the actual health of individual insureds although the insureds them-
selves would know. Adverse selection would result if only the un-
healthy opted for insurance.7 4 Moral hazard occurs when an agent can
take actions that are not directly observable by the principal-so-called
hidden actions. In the principal-agent model, the agent may have a
personal preference for shirking. If the principal cannot directly ob-
serve the agent's effort, it may be difficult to deduce whether lower
profits in a given period derive from shirking or from a random de-
crease in demand.
It is especially important for legal scholars to note that moral hazard
may be possible even when the principal can directly observe an agent's
behavior. If the principal cannot prove in court that an agent is shirk-
ing, then the agent's effort is noncontractible in that a binding contract
cannot be conditioned on effort. 75 The presence of noncontractible
terms can have a dramatic effect on the remaining terms in a contract.
The principal-agent literature attempts to discover contract mecha-
nisms that mitigate the otherwise debilitating effects of moral hazard
and other forms of contractual opportunism. Joseph Farrell and Carl
REV. 51 (1989); Michael Rothschild &Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Afar-
kets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 QJ. ECON. 629 (1976).
71. See pp. 160-61.
72. For example, corporate directors are the agents of their shareholders; lawyers are
the agents of their clients.
73. See, e.g., SanfordJ. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Prob-
lem, 51 ECONOME'rRiCA 7 (1983); Carl Shapiro &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as
a Worker Discipline Device, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1984).
74. See pp. 133-36.
75. P. 140. In some situations, a principal may be able to emulate state enforcement of
noncontractible (but principal observable) terms by entering into a self-enforcing agreement.
See Ayres, supra note 26, at 298.
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Shapiro have recently shown, for example, that when product quality is
noncontractible, both the length and structure of the contractible pro-
visions will be dramatically affected.76
D. Strategic Choice of Legal Rules
Substantive legal rules can play an important role in the context of
asymmetric information. The "shadow of the law" itself constitutes
part of the rules of the game. 77 Strategic choice of legal rules may miti-
gate the inefficiencies of adverse selection or moral hazard. For exam-
ple, Rasmusen notes that "Holmes conjectured in The Common Law that
the reason why sailors at one time received no wages if their ship was
wrecked was to discourage them from taking to the lifeboats too early
to save it.' ' 78 Holmes thus sees this law as an attempt to limit the moral
hazard of sailors during storms by changing the terms of their wage
contract. Rasmusen, however, rejects the appropriateness of this legal
rule because it makes risk averse sailors bear an inefficiently large risk:
"If sailors are more risk averse than ship owners, and pecuniary advan-
tage would not add much to their effort during storms, then the owner
ought to provide insurance to the sailors by guaranteeing them wages
whether the voyage succeeds or not."'79
A substantive legal rule on whether to pay shipwrecked sailors will
obviously have effects when it is immutable-that is, cannot be changed
by prior contract. But even the choice of "default" rules, which can be
set aside by contract,80 can affect the equilibrium outcome. Indeed,
Rasmusen's analysis ignores the possibility of contracting around this
common law standard. Surely, if guaranteeing sailors' wages was effi-
cient, the ship owners and sailors could have expressly contracted for
it. The possibility of contracting around the shipwreck default of no
salary suggests that Rasmusen's criticism should be directed to the inef-
ficiency of additional contracting costs.
Informational asymmetries are at the center of many legal interac-
tion§, especially those involving bargaining. In the coming years, at-
tempts to formalize how legal rules affect strategies and equilibria will
become increasingly prevalent. For example, Rob Gertner and I have
recently argued that lawmakers should sometimes choose default rules
that do not simply minimize transaction costs.8 ' Strategic choice of de-
fault rules can at times give players with private information incentives
to reveal their information by bargaining around the undesirable rule.
In the reorganization context, immutable procedural rules can reduce
76. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 70.
77. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979).
78. P. 152 (citation omitted).
79. Id.
80. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 27, at 87.
81. Id at 92-95, 127.
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opportunities for inefficient separation or pooling at inefficient equilib-
ria.8 2 Law and economics models have often been criticized for assum-
ing full information on the part of all participants.83 At a general level,
the new game theory responds to this criticism by rigorously exploring
how imperfect information among players can affect the resulting
equilibria.
III. CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE STATE OF THE ART
The dominance of the new informational game theory will almost
inevitably affect law and economics scholarship. Those seeking to capi-
talize on a form of academic arbitrage-selling the new contributions of
one discipline to another academic market-will speed the diffusion
rate. This section pauses momentarily to consider whether game the-
ory is appropriate for legal analysis. I analyze three criticisms of the
game-theoretic approach. The first two are more technically substan-
tive and reveal certain failures of game theory to construct well sped-
fled and robust models. The last relates more broadly to a researcher's
methodological "tastes."
A. The Scylla and Chaybdis of Nonexistent and Multiple Equilibria
A continuing problem of the game-theoretic approach concerns the
failure of many models to produce a unique equilibrium. Many dy-
namic game theory models have either no equilibrium or literally an
infinity of possible equilibria. Rasmusen properly warns us that "[a]
model with no equilibrium or multiple equilibria is underspecified." '8 4
The problem of multiple equilibria inheres particularly in infinitely
repeated games and is enshrined in what game theorists call the "Folk
Theorem, so called because no one remembers who should get credit
for it.''85 The Folk Theorem guarantees that there will be an infinity of
equilibria in many games if they are repeated infinitely. Thus, if the
Entry Deterrence Game were repeated not twenty times but infinitely,
one could prove that a wide variety of strategies-such as always fight
or fight half the time-could be part of perfect Nash equilibria.
The problem of nonexistence of a unique equilibrium dissipates,
however, if we merely reduce the number of repetitions from infinity to
a finite but arbitrarily large number. As discussed above, the Chain-
store paradox insures that, for any finitely repeated version of entry
deterrence, the unique perfect Nash equilibrium will be new entry with
incumbent accomodation in each round. Finitely repeated games often
82. See Robert Gertner, Inefficiency in Three-Person Bargaining (Sept. 1989) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
83. See, e.g., W.L.F. Felstiner & Peter Siegelman, Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deterrence for
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produce unique equilibria-but these equilibria often are inconsistent
with our expectation: In a repeated game, incumbents should benefit
from establishing a tough reputation to deter entry.
The introduction of imperfect information games has mitigated this
problem. For example, David Kreps and Robert Wilson have shown
that the unraveling of the Chainstore paradox is not inevitable if the
entrants face incomplete information. 86 If there are a small number of
incumbents who are irrationally tough and if potential entrants cannot
initially tell which type of incumbent they are playing against, then even
soft (rational) incumbents may have incentives to fight entry in the early
rounds of a finitely repeated entry game. The beauty of this type of
model is that it stops the perversity of complete unraveling merely by
interjecting a little incomplete information; there need only be a small
percentage of "tough" incumbents.8 7
The incomplete information "solution" to the unraveling of finitely
repeated games unfortunately falls prey to the multiple equilibria
"problem." Indeed, Jean Tirole and Drew Fudenberg have extended
the results of the Folk Theorem to finite games of incomplete informa-
tion. 88 The failure of game theory to reduce the multiple equilibria of
repeated games without creating the conditions of Chainstore paradox
unraveling significantly reduces its predictive power. The multiplicity
of equilibria described in the Folk Theorem might be the by-product of
unpredictability in the world, or it may be that one needs noneconomic
theories to predict which equilibrium will emerge. Further research
will attempt to refine the solution concept or to change the game's de-
scription to reduce these multiple equilibria. But even the leading the-
orists "suspect that we are running into diminishing returns in the use
of game theory." 89
B. The Arbitrary Importance of Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs
A second technical weakness afflicting dynamic games of incomplete
information concerns the arbitrariness with which modellers can im-
pose out-of-equilibrium assessments. The problem is especially impor-
tant in analyzing pooling equilibria in incomplete games. Consider, for
example, a different version of the Entry Deterrence Game in which
86. David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. EcoN.
THEORY 253 (1982).
87. The use of incomplete information to impede unraveling in finitely repeated games
is also found in the classic article that Rasmusen labels "The Gang of Four," see p. 118, after
its four authors. See Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts & Wilson, supra note 4. This model similarly
shows how a small amount of incomplete information, here in the form of a few "irrational"
tit-for-tat players, can avoid the repeated one-shot "finking" equilibrium caused by unrav-
eling. Rasmusen summarizes: "The irrational players have a small direct influence, but they
matter because other players imitate them.... Not only is hypocrisy the tribute vice pays to
virtue; it's just as good for maintaining social order." P. 118.
88. Drew Fudenberg &Jean Tirole, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or
with Incomplete Information, 56 EcONOMTRICA 533, 547 (1986); see also p. 119.
89. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 134.
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there are two types of potential entrants, "strong" and "weak." It is
more costly for incumbents to fight "strong" entrants, and the payoffs
for fighting strong entrants are accordingly lower than the payoffs for
fighting weak entrants. The game has asymmetric information, because
the incumbent only knows the proportions of strong and weak in the
general population, not the particular type of potential entrant in this
game.
Under these assumptions, there are two possible pooling strategies
for the two types of potential entrants: Both could choose to enter or
both could choose not to enter. If we wanted to check to see whether a
pooling equilibrium existed, we would, for example, examine whether
strategies
Potential entrant plays:
[Don't Enter, if "strong"; Don't Enter, if "weak"]; and
Incumbent plays: [Fight]
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this pooling equilibrium,
the incumbent does not learn anything from the entrant's decision not
to enter because all entrants-both weak and strong-behave the same.
Accordingly, if 90 percent of the potential entrants are "weak," then an
incumbent would deduce that in equilibrium the proportion of "weak"
entrants would continue to be 90 percent. 90
The problem in evaluating pooling equilibria is to determine how
uninformed players should make out-of-equilibrium assessments of the
other player's type. In the previous example, what is an incumbent's
assessment of the entrant's type if for some reason entry occurs? Be-
cause this is a pooling equilibrium, neither weak nor strong entrants
are supposed to enter. How are we to determine which type is more
likely to make a mistake?9'
Game theory does not provide definite answers to this question. In-
deed, any assessment can be consistent with a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium. Without more, a modeller might arbitrarily posit that, if entry
occurs, incumbents will assume there is only a 20 percent chance that
the entrant is "weak." More importantly, the specification of these out-
of-equilibrium assessments will often determine whether a given pool-
ing equilibrium is perfect.
There is a sense in the literature that the discretion to choose these
assessments arbitrarily gives modellers too many degrees of freedom to
skew the results of a model. Game theorists have responded by devel-
oping a number of what Rasmusen calls "exotic refinements" 92 which
restrict in one way or another the out-of-equilibrium assessments that
90. In probabilistic terms, the probability that a potential entrant is "weak" conditioned
on its entry remains 90%: Prob("weak"/entry) = 90.
91. Bayes's Rule is of no assistance in updating conditional beliefs after out-of-equilib-
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can be used to support a pooling equilibrium. For example, using pas-
sive conjectures means that prior beliefs would be unchanged by out-of-
equilibrium behavior. Passive conjectures in the foregoing version of
the Entry Deterrence Game would mean that the incumbent would con-
tinue to believe that there is a 90 percent chance that an entrant is
weak.
These exotic refinements lack general applicability, but it is not
clear whether the game theorists should be embarrassed by this "prob-
lem." The difficulty of drawing inferences from events that in equilib-
rium are supposed take place with zero probability inheres in the real
world. Indeed, it may be that other social sciences can be used to
guide the choice of these assessments. There is, for instance, a large
literature in sociology on deviance and the inferences that are drawn
from deviant behavior.93 Our assessments of deviance or out-of-equi-
librium behavior can intuitively affect the stability of an equilibrium. In
the Entry Deterrence Game, if an incumbent infers that entry means
there is a high probability that an entrant is weak, the pooling equilib-
rium will cease to be perfect. The "weakness" of game theory in speci-
fying particular assessments is to my mind a species of strength because
game-theoretic research has forced us to probe this conundrum in a
more rigorous and clearly specified manner.
C. Nature Does Not Jump94
The time-honored trilogy of the microeconomic method has been to
model economic phenomena by making reductionist assumptions
about reality,95 to solve the model to determine what equilibrium will
result given these assumptions, and to examine how the equilibrium is
affected by small perturbations in the underlying assumptions. At this
metamethodological level, the game-theoretic approach is no different.
This review has shown that game theorists model and solve their mod-
els in distinctive ways. It is in the third enterprise, however, that the
game-theoretic approach most distinguishes itself.
The third goal might be labelled "kicking around the model"-one
kicks (or perturbs) an underlying assumption to see if and how this per-
turbation affects the equilibrium. Resolving the model reveals whether
the results are "robust" to alternative assumptions. For neoclassical
economists, this enterprise has often focused on how the equilibrium
values respond to small perturbations in the underlying parameters of
the model. Since Paul Samuelson created the field of "comparative
statics,"' 96 economists have concerned themselves with policy questions
93. See, e.g., DEVIANCE: THE INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE (E. Rubington & M. Weinberg
5th ed. 1987); SOCIAL DEVIANCE (R. Farrell & V. Swigert 2d ed. 1978).
94. See CAROLUS LINNAEUS, PHILOSOPHIA BOTANICA § 77 (1751) ("Natura non facit
salus" or, in English, "Nature does not proceed by leaps").
95. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN PoSrrIvE ECONOMICS (1953).
96. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 3, at 7-8.
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of the type: What would happen to United States unemployment if we
slightly raised a given tariff or tax? Traditional neoclassical economists
answer these questions by taking a derivative.9 7 The traditional model
would state equilibrium values for such variables as unemployment in
terms of underlying assumptions such as the tariff or tax rate and then
analyze the comparative statics of the model by taking the derivative of
the equilibrium variable with respect to the underlying parameters.98
The core result of the comparative statics method is that infinitesi-
mal changes in a parameter of a model will only bring about infinitesi-
mal changes in the equilibrium variables. Changing the underlying
values will move the equilibrium, but the equilibrium values will not
move discontinuously-that is, they will not jump.
Calculating the comparative statics in game theory models, how-
ever, is often much more difficult than simply taking derivatives. More-
over, many games exhibit discontinuous changes when the underlying
structure is changed slightly. Rasmusen warns the reader that compar-
ative statics
can be especially tricky in game theory. If a parameter is changed, and
one player changes his strategy in response, that change in turn in-
duces a change in the strategies of the other players, so when the game
settles down to its new equilibrium, the strategies might be quite
different.99
The discontinuous nature of many game-theoretic models should
caution legal policymakers. To the extent that such models are appro-
priate, equilibrium outcomes may not be robust to even slight changes
in legal standards: A slight change in a due care standard, for example,
might generate significant changes in the players' underlying behavior.
More fundamentally, the discontinuous nature of game theory models
might signal that the models offer weak predictions of human behavior.
If one's underlying view of reality is like Einstein's-that "nature does
notjump"-then one cannot find solace in many of the results of game
theory.
Game-theoretic nature does jump, at times, in ways that put elec-
tron clouds to shame. 100 A similar tension over whether nature jumps
is being played out now among evolutionary biologists, as Stephen Jay
97. Consistent with this traditional approach, many economic dissertations consist of
solving simple models and then taking derivatives of the equilibrium variables with respect to
every conceivable underlying parameter. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Essays on Vertical Foreclosure,
Cartel Stability and the Structural Determinants of Oligopolistic Behavior (Dec. 1987) (Ph.D
dissertation) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
98. For example, if in solving a model one could calculate a value for unemployment as a
function of tariff, U(t), then one could calculate the effect of increasing the tax rate slightly by
taking the derivative dU(t)/dt.
99. P. 124; see Steven Lippman, John Mamer & Kevin McCardle, Comparative Statics in
Non-Cooperative Games via Transfinitely Iterated Play, 41 J. EcoN. THEORy 288 (1987).
100. The argument that game theory models are "wrong" because nature does not jump
is analogous to the argument that complicated models must somehow be flawed because un-
derlying reality must be comprehensible.
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Gould has attempted to refine Darwinian notions of gradual change
with his own notion of "punctuated equilibria."'101 While such deep
structural aspects of reality cannot be tested in statistically meaningful
ways, I submit that one's intuitive sense about their truth influences
whether particular readers will have a taste for game-theoretic models.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF GAMES
The current failure of game theory to penetrate legal analysis may
be due to these weaknesses or to the novel and technical aspects of
modelling and solving games. This review has argued that Games and
Information reduces the costs of acquiring the new tools and that invest-
ing time and effort in mastering the new techniques for modelling
games of asymmetric and incomplete information is cost-justified, espe-
cially now. Whether readers should make this investment, however,
turns in part on whether one believes the new game theory will catch on
in the legal community in the coming years. I have argued that these
new techniques will command a wider audience.102 But in the interest
of full disclosure, I sense that the rate of diffusion will have a political
determinant as well.
The thrust of many game theory articles is to demonstrate how stra-
tegic interactions can lead to inefficient results.103 The "new" game
theory thus runs against the laissez-faire policy prescriptions of the Chi-
cago school of law and economics. Game theory applications are sus-
ceptible to George Stigler's criticism of traditional (non-Chicago)
oligopoly theory by "making departures from competition the central
problem of industrial organization."' 1 4 Indeed, the new game theory is
the core methodology of the new "new learning" in industrial organiza-
tion' 05 -which, for example, has attempted to resuscitate discarded no-
tions that predation and leveraging might be rational profit-maximizing
strategies. 10 6 The Chicago school had proposed a priori theories sug-
gesting why market competition should generate efficiency. Game-the-
oretic analysis demonstrates rigorously that under at least certain
101. See STEPHENJAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE (1989).
102. Indeed, there are already signs of seepage. The Law and Economics Section of the
Association of American Law Schools on January 6, 1990, sponsored a panel coincidentally
entitled "Games and Information." The panelists-Carl Shapiro, Louis Kaplow, and Alan
Schwartz-demonstrated a number of legal applications of the new informational tools.
103. See, e.g., pp. 205 ("the outcome [of signalling models] is often inefficient"), 231
(noncooperative bargaining models generate equilibria that are neither "neat, fair, beautiful,
[nor] efficient"), 273 (in determining the location of stores "the competitive market does not
achieve efficiency").
104. George J. Stigler, Palgrave's Dictionay of Economics, 26 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1729,
1734 (1988).
105. SeeJanusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, Proving Predation After Monfort and Matsu-
shita: What the "New Learning" Has to Offer, ANTrrRUsT, Summer 1987, at 5, 6.
106. See Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537 (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds. 1989); David
Scharfstein, A Policy to Prevent Rational Test-Market Predation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 229 (1984);
Janusz A. Ordover, Vertical Integration and Overbuying (ABF Working Paper) (1989).
May 1990] GAME THEORY 1315
HeinOnline -- 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1315 1989-1990
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
assumptions markets can fail to promote social welfare.' 0 7 The results
of these models force laissez-faire advocates to change the nature of
their arguments.
Rasmusen's own analysis of health insurance illustrates this point.
Because of adverse selection, "[W]hen the price of insurance is appro-
priate for the average old person, healthier ones stop buying."108 After
these people drop out of the insurance pool, "[t]he price must rise to
keep profits nonnegative."' 0 9 If adverse selection is severe, the market
for old age health insurance will unravel to the point where only the
sickest people will be sold insurance at much higher prices. This sim-
ple story provides what might seem a powerful rationale for govern-
ment intervention: "[A]dverse selection is an argument for
government-enforced pooling. If all old people are required to
purchase government insurance (Medicare in the United States), then
while the healthier of them may be worse off, the vast majority could be
helped."'1 0 But Rasmusen goes on to warn readers not to be beguiled
by such "dangerous" arguments:
Using adverse selection to justify medicare, however, points out how
dangerous many of the models in this book can be. For policy ques-
tions, the best default opinion is that markets are efficient. On closer
examination, we have found that many markets are inefficient because
of strategic behavior or information asymmetry. It is dangerous, how-
ever, to immediately conclude that the government should intervene,
because the same arguments applied to government show that the cure
might be worse than the disease. 1II
Once game-theoretic models demonstrate the potential for market fail-
ure, supporters of nonintervention by government can no longer rely
solely on a priori arguments that the market is a first best solution. In-
107. Avery Katz has similarly argued that
for scholars who work within the framework of law and economics, whatever account
of strategic behavior costs that one is led to by one's theory of bargaining will deter-
mine one's basic normative stance toward legal rules.... [T]his is the primary differ-
ence separating the so-called "conservative" and "liberal" wings of law and
economics scholarship.




111. Id. I would note that Rasmusen's presumption or "best default opinion" that mar-
kets are efficient is not a prerequisite of economic or game-theoretic analysis. In a different
context, Richard Posner has debated withJohn Donohue whether Title VII drives out discrim-
ination in employment at the efficient rate. CompareJohn J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986), with Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987). In an oral debate at Northwestern, Posner argued that as a
historical matter he did not believe that in 1964 the market was driving out discrimination at
an efficient rate, but as an economist one must presume efficiency.
Unlike Rasmusen and Posner, I do not believe that an economist has to presume effi-
ciency and am leery of public policy decisions that turn on that initial presumption. Even if
one presumes efficiency, much will turn on what are the necessary and sufficient conditions
for rebutting this presumption.
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stead, advocates of nonintervention must argue either that the assump-
tions of the game theory model are empirically invalid or that laissez-
faire policies are a second best because the costs of any government
intervention outweigh its benefits.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the "Harvard" school of industrial organi-
zation focused the attention of economists on detailed case studies of
individual industries. 1 2 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the "Chi-
cago" school replaced this fact-intensive industry analysis with price
theory. Its explicit claim was that powerful and simple tools of price
theory could be applied to diverse markets better than the industry case
studies which, while factually detailed, were often poorly grounded in
economic theory."13 The new game theory harks back, in a sense, to
the earlier case study approach in that game theorists have developed a
number of models to examine individual aspects of industrial behav-
ior."14 The game-theoretic analysis then is similarly susceptible to the
Chicago critique that the particularized games are not neatly applicable
to a broad spectrum of markets. Game theorists respond that the broad
generalization of price theory is inappropriate when small numbers of
players act strategically-that is, when the assumptions of price theory
are violated. At a minimum, the stylized games rigorously demonstrate
a number of "possibility" theorems which force both sides toward em-
pirical analysis.
I predict that in the next decade there will be a small skirmish over
the propriety of using game-theoretic analysis to answer legal ques-
tions. The dispute will not merely be an academic quarrel about the
correct way to express the same reality: Decisions about legal policy
will hang in the balance. Game theory models can generate substan-
tively different policies than other modes of law and economic analysis.
Laissez-faire advocates have often been able to claim the "scientific"
mantle of law and economics, but game theory may allow proponents
of government intervention to seize the scientific high ground.
Game theorists will be attacked by those who have grown leery of
the reductivist methods of economic reasoning, but possibly stronger
attacks will come from laissez-faire advocates within the law and eco-
nomics community itself. Politics will undoubtedly influence the de-
bate, but Rasmusen's book offers insights for both friend and foe. By
making the fundamental concepts accessible, Games and Information
paves the way for a more reasoned analysis of whether and when it is
appropriate to play games with the law.
112. See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959);JAMES W. MCKIE, TIN CANS
AND TIN PLATE: A STUDY OF COMPETITION IN Two RELATED METHODS (1959).
113. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976).
114. Carl Shapiro also made this analogy at his recent address to the Association of
American Law Schools convention. See note 102 supra.
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